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mechanism not to work in the case of food safety. Given that public institutions will 
tend to set nationally divergent food quality standards, many will act as barriers to trade. 
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Introduction 
Throughout history, the prime concern of mankind has been to assure the supply of a 
sufficient quantity of food. Quality considerations played only a secondary role. 
However, by the early 1980s the fear of persistent food scarcity had dissipated and was 
replaced by concerns over food surpluses in the developed world (von Witzke and 
Ruttan, 1989). This switch in the perception of food scarcity has been paralleled by a 
growing emphasis on food quality. 
The growing demand for many food quality components is usually expressed in 
the form of a growing demand for food quality standards. Such standards represent 
public goods and thus involve a market failure. The general focus of this paper is on 
both the nature of this market failure and its central implications for agricultural and 
trade policy. 
The paper is outlined as follows: in Section 1, a theoretical model of the market 
for food quality components is presented. In Section 2, the implications of this model 
for international trade and agricultural policy are discussed. The paper concludes in 
Section 3 with some thoughts on the methodology of trade and policy analysis in the 
presence of food quality standards. 
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1. Theoretical Background 
There appears to be general consensus that many quality components can be left 
to market forces. A growing demand for quality will eventually be met through free 
contracting between private agents both domestically and internationally. However, 
there is also a consensus that certain quality components require regulation as a result of 
irreversible health consequences of consuming food with negative quality components 
and because of asymmetric information on those quality components (Kinsey, 1990; 
Kramer, 1990). 
In examining the nature of market failure in the provision of food standards, it is 
useful to outline a model of contractual performance originally suggested by Klein and 
Leffler (1981). Consider a situation where, each period, consumers purchase a food 
product x which embodies a level of quality q. Prior to consumption, individuals are 
uncertain about the actual quality of the good but are able to ascertain, by pre-purchase 
inspection, that it meets a minimum standard, i.e. fruit is unblemished. Over the 
consumption period, as the good is experienced, consumers are able to costlessly 
communicate information to each other about the goad's actual quality. If the quality is 
lower than claimed, the seller is punished by non-repeat purchase. 
Assume many firms can supply the market with identical technology. Further, 
assume that the cost function is given as: 
C - c(x,q) + F(q) 
where c and Fare variable and fixed costs respectively. Higher quality and quantity 
generate higher production costs. Marginal costs increase with quality. 
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Focussing on Figure 1, MCqmin and ACqmin refer to the costs for a good of 
minimum quality, whilst MCqh and ACqh refer to costs for a high-quality good, P 0 and P 1 
being the relevant competitive prices. Given that consumers can only observe that a 
good is of minimum quality pre-purchase, sellers will always have an incentive to cheat 
by selling x3 of the low-quality good at the high-quality price, as the one-period quasi-
rents from cheating outweigh the zero quasi-rents of being honest. Rational consumers 
will realize this, and because of the moral hazard, will only be willing to pay P 0 • 
Therefore, only low-quality goods will be produced. 
However, there may exist a price above the competitive price P 1 that will motivate 
firms to supply high-quality goods, i.e. P 2 which generates a price premium such that the 
perpetual quasi-rents from supplying high-quality outweigh the one-period rents from 
cheating1• In a competitive equilibrium, firms cannot earn positive profits, hence entry 
would force the market price below the quality assuring level. In order to generate an 
equilibrium, Klein and Leffler argue that firms will compete such profits away by 
investing in firm-specific assets that incur non-salvageable costs, e.g. brand names, logos 
and advertising. This shifts up the cost curve for high-quality goods to ACqh + s. Firms 
will not cheat by selling low-quality at the high price P 2 as they will lose future sales and 
incur a capital loss. Also, investment in specific assets acts as a signalling device to 
consumers where they are uncertain about firms' cost structures2• 
1 See Klein and Leffler (1981) for the precise technical condition. 
2 Allen (1984) argues that the Klein and Leffler proposition does not hold if consumers can observe the price 
and output of firms and have information on costs. 
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Figure 1 Pricing and Quality Levels 
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Given this analysis, how robust is it when the quality index for a product is a 
vector of characteristics? As Kinsey notes, food quality is a continuum of characteristics 
ranging from the very negative such as unsafe food to positive in terms of taste and 
convenience. The combination of the price premium and the repeat-purchase 
mechanism would likely generate a Pareto optimum for positive quality characteristics 
such as taste, and we certainly observe food processing firms investing in non-
salvageable, firm-specific assets such as brand names. 
However, it seems less likely that contractual assurance can be assured in the case 
of negative characteristics. The repeat-purchase mechanism is based on the idea that 
consumers can evaluate quality immediately after consumption. When consumption of a 
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good bears a health risk, markets fail to achieve a Pareto optimum. Honest firms may 
invest in firm-specific assets concerning food safety, but because the repeat-purchase 
mechanism is undermined by consumer uncertainty, dishonest firms have an incentive to 
free-ride and cheat3. Hence the moral hazard problem remains in the case of negative 
quality characteristics, and a competitive market will not provide the necessary quality 
information. Of course, information itself has the characteristics of a public good 
(Stiglitz, 1985). 
Even if the repeat-purchase mechanism works, it will tend to be sub-optimal in 
terms of known risks. For example, salmonella poisoning from eggs was not widely 
known to UK consumers until a government minister publicly claimed that all eggs sold 
in the UK were affected by salmonella, generating an almost immediate boycott by 
consumers, i.e. all eggs were assumed to be of low quality. 
2. Implications for Trade and Policy 
The demand for food quality, as well as for food safety and health standards, is a 
function of a number of variables. Both food quality and standards represent luxury 
goods (Falconi and Roe, 1990). Growing incomes, together with improved knowledge 
about health risks have led to a significant growth in demand for food quality in the last 
decade. Of course, the demand for food quality and food quality standards is also a 
function of other environmental hazards that consumers are exposed to and of 
(nationally divergent) preferences. 
3 See Falconi and Roe (1990) for analysis of incentives to firms to distort safety information. 
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Moreover, the demand for food safety and health standards is driven by the 
growing opportunity cost of human time. Food components are frequently not easy to 
recognize. The cost of information on food quality components tends to rise with 
increasing opportunity costs of time. In addition, rising opportunity costs of time 
stimulate increased demand for food away from home (Senauer, 1979) and, thus, lead to 
a growing intake of food for which there is uncertainty about the quality components 
(Falconi and Roe, 1990). 
As the variables determining the demand for food quality and food safety and 
health standards are different from one country to another, there will be differences in 
each country's optimum quality standards (in terms of positive as well as normative 
analysis) in the absence of international policy coordination. Such nationally divergent 
standards obviously represent barriers to trade. In terms of the previous analysis of 
contractual enforcement, this has a number of implications for policy and welfare 
evaluation. 
Barriers to trade in the form of food quality standards could be removed through 
international harmonization of food quality standards. An international agricultural 
trading system which is free of barriers to trade represents an international public good. 
A single country cannot supply itself with such a good except in cooperation with other 
countries (Runge, von Witzke and Thompson, 1989). To the extent that a country can 
be made better-off by removing barriers to trade, there is an incentive for each country 
involved to pursue political strategies which could lead to harmonization of food quality 
standards among countries. 
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However, international harmonization of food quality standards may be very 
difficult to achieve for a variety of reasons. First, the general problems of public goods 
provisions have to be solved. As is well known, public goods are difficult to provide 
efficiently because of incentives for free-riding by the agents involved, and agreement has 
to be achieved over the distribution of contributions to the cost of providing the public 
good. 
Second, the international distributive problems are aggravated in the case of food 
quality standards by the fact that the demand for both food quality and food quality 
standards is a positive function of income. However, incomes tend to be unequally 
distributed among countries making it more difficult to agree on uniform food quality 
standards. 
Third, the growing importance of food quality standards will also re-define trade 
relations between the developed and the developing world. Food exporting countries are 
likely to face more barriers to trade, as developed countries introduce additional and 
tighten existing food safety and health standards. Less developed countries may have 
problems meeting standards set by wealthy countries because, in many cases, new 
production techniques are human capital intensive; human capital, however, is scarce in 
most low income countries. Moreover, production technologies that meet the standards 
developed in wealthy countries, may not be efficient under either the climatic conditions 
or relative factor prices in developing countries. A further dimension of this problem is 
that some developed food exporting nations may opt to constrain domestic sales of foods 
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to those that meet domestic standards but allow the production of below-standard foods 
for export to other countries with less restrictive regulation. 
Fourth, the growing demand for food quality tends to favor political coalitions 
between farm interest groups and consumers. In developed countries, the influential 
minority of agricultural producers, seeking protection from foreign competition may find 
increasingly attractive coalition partners in consumers seeking protection from food and 
related health risks via food quality standards. 
Finally, (nationally divergent) food quality standards may gain in importance as a 
substitute for more traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. Progress in 
international negotiations on a more liberal international agricultural trade, such as those 
in the GATT, may have been slow but they have contributed to significant policy 
adjustments both in the United States and the European Community (EC). In both 
countries, agricultural price supports have been reduced in real terms in recent years. Of 
course, if one instrument is taken away from an influential interest group, such as 
farmers in developed countries, its political power is usually not broken. If traditional 
forms of agricultural income support continue to lose their importance, agricultural 
interest groups will find substitutes. Again food quality standards and a coalition with 
consumers is likely to be an attractive option. 
For the reasons outlined, it is expected that food quality standards will play an 
increasingly important role as non-tariff barriers to international trade (see also Runge, 
1990). Recently, there has been a growing incidence of international disputes over food 
quality and food quality standards. There was disagreement between the EC and the 
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United States over the use of growth hormone in beef production and the Community 
threatened to ban the import of all beef from the United States for this reason. Also, 
the EC now requires that foreign meat processing plants meet EC standards. Recently, 
the EC significantly reduced the number of certified plants, causing the United States to 
threaten retaliation. 
In reality then, there are apparently serious impediments to the harmonization of 
food quality standards which are likely to prove difficult to overcome. This can be 
demonstrated by the experience over time of both the United States and the EC. In the 
case of the United States, despite being a nation state for 200 years, there are still 
numerous interstate trade barriers. Many of them are based on differences in food 
quality and related standards. 
In the case of the EC, one of the central objectives of the scheduled completion 
of the internal market by the end of 1992 is to remove all internal barriers to trade. It 
has now become apparent that the Community will fail to adopt a uniform set of 
standards before the 1992 deadline. It seems (Swinbank, 1990 and Gray, 1990) that the 
EC has in fact adopted the principle of "mutual recognition" in its approach to food 
standards harmonization. Products manufactured and sold within a particular EC 
country, and those imported from a non-EC country, are subject to that country's set of 
quality standards, whilst products imported from other member states only have to meet 
the standards set by their relevant governments. Therefore, the EC Commission appears 
to be following a policy of minimum standards. 
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In terms of the previous analysis of contractual enforcement, if the concept of 
"mutual recognition" were applied to trade between a wider set of countries than the EC, 
it would have a number of implications for welfare evaluation. First, if individual 
countries set differing food safety and health standards which translate into sunk costs 
for firms, there will be a range of qualities of goods that can be freely traded. This may 
be beneficial if there is a non-uniform distribution amongst consumers of the willingness 
to pay for quality. It also means that price differences for a particular food product will 
be observed for reasons other than transport costs. However, a range of differing 
product standards for the same type of product may interfere with the signalling 
mechanism of a particular country's set of standards and serve to increase consumer 
uncertainty. 
Second, if the process of harmonization of international food quality standards 
focusses on a minimum set of standards, those firms from countries with higher standards 
may have an incentive to demand that domestic standards be lowered in order to allow 
them to compete with imports that embody a lower set of standards. 
3. Summary and Conclusions 
Using a simple model of contractual enforcement, it has been shown in this paper that 
asymmetric information on quality components is sufficient for a market determined, 
quality-enforcement mechanism not to work in the case of food safety, and hence safety 
standards may have to be set by public institutions . In this context, an attempt has been 
made to analyze the implications for international agricultural trade and policy of the 
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growing demand for food quality. This demand will result in a growing abundance of 
(nationally divergent) food quality standards. Many of them will act as barriers to trade. 
Political coalitions between consumers and agricultural producers demanding protection 
are likely to gain in importance, which will add a new dimension to attempts at 
international agricultural and trade policy coordination such as those in the GAIT. 
The growing demand for food safety and health standards also raises new 
methodological problems for which, as yet, there are no agreed answers. Specifically, the 
following issues are mentioned: 
- If a Pareto optimum for each country requires them to set nationally divergent 
standards (public goods), free trade may have to be abandoned as the reference 
situation for trade and policy analysis, so what is it replaced by? 
- If harmonization of standards is desirable for at least some countries, how 
should and how will countries cooperate in this regard? 
-As the units of analysis are not individual economic agents, the political 
economic process needs to be understood both at the domestic and international 
level. 
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